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Abstract
This article studies crime rates’ response to economic conditions. Using a longitudinal 
data set covering about 20 countries over the period 1970-2010, we investigate 
whether crime rates respond asymmetrically to increases in unemployment and 
recoveries in economic conditions. We find a positive response of crime rates 
on variation in unemployment rates, but we do not find compelling evidence of 
asymmetric responses to positive and negative variations in the economic cycle.
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Introduction
Understanding how crime rates respond to strong variations in economic conditions is 
an important and interesting task for economists, social scientists, and policy makers 
alike. Theoretically, several possible linkages between economic conditions and crime 
exist. On the one hand, during recessions, unemployment increases and wages may 
fall lowering the opportunity cost of time spent in criminal activity as suggested in the 
basic economic model of crime (Becker, 1968) and remarked in some of the first 
empirical papers on the topic (Machin & Meghir, 2004; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 
2001). On the other hand, during the recession, younger people could migrate abroad, 
thus reducing the share of the population more prone to crime. Moreover, during 
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recessions, both the quality of criminal opportunities and the consumption of crimino-
genic commodities such as alcohol should reduce by lowering crime rates. This non-
exhaustive list shows that theory is of little help to formulate clear-cut predictions 
about the impact of economic downturns on crime. Overall, the impact of economic 
crises and crime rates remains an empirical question, which is even more interesting 
in the light of the recent great recession. Researchers during the last decades have 
looked more systematically for empirical answers. Unfortunately on the empirical 
side, identifying the impact of economic downturns on crime is perhaps even more 
challenging than making sound theoretical predictions.
The first empirical challenge reflects the reason why it is interesting to study the 
link between economic conditions and crime: they might respond to each other. In 
fact, a positive correlation between economic downturns and crime rates might simply 
be driven by reverse causality. A second crucial empirical challenge concerns the 
choice of the relevant variable of interest. One option is focusing on aggregate macro-
economic indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP). Following this option, 
we would focus on the main variable defining a recession. Nonetheless, finding plau-
sibly exogenous source of variation allowing us to identify the impact of GDP would 
be extremely difficult. Moreover, using such a reduced form-macro approach, we 
could erroneously reach the conclusion that economic conditions do not affect crime 
if the overall macro-measures are linked to variations of other variables that affect 
crime rates in different ways, thus compensating each other. A second option would be 
focusing on other variables that are affected by economic crises, such as unemploy-
ment rate, and that in turn have a more direct theoretical link with crime rates. Such an 
approach has the double advantage of making identification easier and of isolating 
more clearly some of the possible channels linking economic conditions and crime. In 
addition, such an exercise would make it easier, linking the econometric analysis to 
policy recommendations. Thus in this article, we opt for this second approach by 
focusing on the effect of unemployment on crime. In our exercise, we will take a par-
ticular angle of analysis: We will test whether crime rates respond symmetrically or 
asymmetrically to variations in unemployment. Specifically, we test whether crime 
rates respond in the same way to changes in unemployment rate during recoveries and 
recessions or whether the response is asymmetric. Indeed, we may expect that, for 
example, crime rates are more sensitive to unemployment rate during recessions rather 
than during recoveries.
Our exercise builds upon the empirical strategy recently proposed by Mocan and 
Bali (2010). We will use a longitudinal data set covering 18 countries and several types 
of crimes (total crime, homicide, burglary, and robbery) since 1970. Our panel data 
structure will let us control for country and time fixed-effects and for county-specific 
time trends, thus absorbing heterogeneity over different dimensions. Moreover, we 
will add a set of controls for other potential determinants of crime. As pointed out by 
Mocan and Bali, there are different reasons why crime might respond asymmetrically 
to changes in unemployment rates. One has been stressed by Mocan, Naci, Billups, 
and Overland (2005): If individuals enter criminal markets during economic down-
turns, their criminal skills improve while the skills that can plausibly be used in legal 
markets deteriorate, when the cycle reverts it will then take time to recover the lost 
skills and this would cause some hysteresis in crime. A second reason why crime rates 
might not react to unemployment rate growth and reduction in the same way relates to 
the criminal justice system congestion and general equilibrium effects (Drago & 
Galbiati, 2012; Galbiati & Zanella, 2012). If crime increases during economic down-
turn as a response to unemployment and criminal justice system, resources devoted to 
deterrence do not react fast, the increase in crime rates might induce some congestion 
in the system, thus reducing its deterrence capacity and implying a further increase in 
crime rates. When the unemployment cycle reverts, as the criminal justice system 
keeps on suffering some congestion, crime rates might not show immediate contrac-
tion. Thus, for these simple and other possible reasons, it is worth separating unem-
ployment growth from unemployment reduction in the analysis of their link with 
crime rates.
Our results show that unemployment rates have a substantial effect on crime. For 
example, in our preferred estimation, a one percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment increases total crime by 1.3% and homicide rate by 1.7%. On the other side, a 
one percentage point decrease in unemployment rate lowers total crime rate by 1.7% 
and homicide rate by 1.8%. However, we do not find compelling evidence that crime 
response to unemployment is asymmetric in the way suggested by Mocan and Bali 
(2010). These estimates are important also in the light of the great recession. In the 
sample of the countries analyzed in the article, the increase in the unemployment rate 
from 2009 to 2012 has been of about four percentage points. Using our estimates, the 
total crime and the homicide rates increased by 5.2% and 6.8%, respectively, due to 
the increase in the unemployment rate.
This is not the first article focusing on the effect of economic downturn on crime. 
As we have already pointed out, the closest article to ours is Mocan and Bali (2010), 
that is the first documenting the asymmetric response of crime to changes in unem-
ployment rates. While we build on Mocan and Bali’s empirical strategy, we use a dif-
ferent data set for our empirical exercise. Mocan and Bali resort to within country U.S. 
data, whereas our article exploits a data set that allows international comparison. Our 
exercise therefore takes a different macro-perspective. In a previous article, Buonanno, 
Drago, Galbiati, and Zanella (2011) have analyzed the impact of unemployment on 
crime using a cross-country longitudinal data set and, without disentangling asymmet-
ric responses, they find no effect of unemployment on aggregate crime rates. This 
finding remarks the interest of disentangling potential asymmetric effects of unem-
ployment on crime.
Other interesting studies focusing on the effects of unemployment on crime using 
panel data at the state or regional level are Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001); Gould, 
Weinberg, and Mustard (2002); Oster and Agell (2007); Lin (2008); and Fougère, 
Kramarz, and Pouget (2009). All these articles seem to reach a consensus that increas-
ing unemployment contributes to rise in property crimes (although the magnitude is 
not large) and does not significantly affect violent crimes. They are nonetheless unable 
to provide some information about asymmetries in the responses of crime rates to dif-
ferent stages of the cycles.
More in general, some other articles have focused on the aggregate impact of eco-
nomic shocks and/or the business cycle on crime. One of the first articles in the field 
is Cook and Zarkin (1985), finding that property crimes’ trends in the United States are 
countercyclical. While all these articles use contemporary data, recently some articles 
have resorted to historical data. In particular, Bignon, Caroli, and Galbiati (2011) 
resort to data on criminal records collected by the French Ministry of Justice starting 
in the 19th century and use the phylloxera crisis that burst in France in the second half 
of the 19th century to identify the impact of economic downturns in France. Mehlum, 
Miguel, and Torvik (2006) instead estimate the impact of poverty on crime in 19th 
century Bavaria (one of the German states). The authors use rainfall as an instrumental 
variable for rye prices and show that an increase in rye prices following bad weather 
conditions induces an increase in property crime and leads to significantly less violent 
crime. Traxler and Burhop (2010) replicate the exercise by Mehlum et al. for Prussia 
and find similar results.
Finally, while our article focuses on comparison between developed countries, 
some recent articles have focused on the impact of economic downturns in developing 
countries. In particular, Miguel (2005) resorts to survey data on rural Tanzania to show 
that the killing of “witches” (i.e. old women) increases in times of extreme weather 
events leading to floods and droughts. Fafchamps and Minten (2006) exploit an exog-
enous cut in fuel supply in rural Madagascar following a disputed presidential election 
to identify the effects of a massive increase in poverty and transport costs. Using origi-
nal survey data collected in 2002, they find that crop theft increases with transitory 
poverty. Theft thus appears to be used by some of the rural poor as a risk coping 
strategy.
Empirical Strategy
As discussed in the “Introduction,” the impact of unemployment on crime may be 
asymmetric. The standard empirical analysis assumes a symmetric relationship 
between job market opportunities (i.e. unemployment rate) and criminal activity. In 
other words, the effect on criminal activity of an increase in unemployment is equal to 
the effect on crime of a decrease in unemployment. As in Mocan and Bali (2010), in 
order to account for asymmetric response of crime to changes in unemployment rates 
(source: OECD statistics), we construct two variables URate+ and URate− defined in 
equation (1) as follows:
URate URatet t
+ = if URate URatet t> −1
URate+t = 0 if URate URate 1t t< −
URatet
− = 0 if URate URate 1t t< −
URatet
− = 0  if 
URate URatet t> −1
We estimate the relationship between labor market opportunities and crime using 
cross-country annual panel data, focusing on total crime rate and homicide rate. 
Nevertheless, we also consider the asymmetric impact of unemployment on other cat-
egories of property crimes. Our estimating equation (equation [2]) is as follows:
crime tit it it i= + + + + + +
−β β β γ χ ε0 1
+
2X URate URateit t i it ,φ
where crimeit represents crime rate in country i at time t, Xit are standard controls for 
country characteristics. Our list of control variables is likely to be incomplete, as it is 
impossible to control for all factors affecting crime. Thus, to control for unobserved 
factors, we exploit the panel structure of our data set and include country-specific 
effects (γi). We also include year dummies (φ) in order to control for exogenous shocks 
in crime rates that are common to all countries. Moreover, as a robustness check, we 
add to our econometric specification linear specific time trends to control for variation 
in within-country crime rates due to unobserved country-specific determinants (see 
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001). More precisely, in the regression model, t is a linear 
polynomial in time. Finally, εit is an error term. We are mainly interested in estimating 
the coefficients β1 and β2.
Data
Measuring crime is a challenging and crucial task, as it is a necessary condition for a 
correct assessment of crime trends and their determinants. In a cross-country frame-
work, two kinds of issues need to be considered.
First, reported crimes underestimate the true (unobserved) number of committed 
crimes, which may bias econometric estimates of the effect of those determinants 
of criminal activity that are correlated with the extent of underreporting. This prob-
lem is well known in the crime literature and it is usually dealt with by taking loga-
rithms of crime rates and exploiting the panel structure of data to include fixed 
effects for geographical areas and time periods; see, for instance, Ehrlich (1996), 
Levitt (1996), Gould et al. (2002), Oster and Agell (2007), and Fougère et al. 
(2009). This approach sweeps out measurement errors that are constant within geo-
graphical areas (over time) or within periods (across areas). Another issue is that 
reporting rates differ across countries and vary over time in a non-uniform way, as 
it is suggested by comparing data from surveys of victims and from reports to the 
police (see, for instance, Soares, 2004 and van Dijk, van Kesteren, & Smit, 2007). 
One may wonder whether different and varying reporting rates bias the picture we 
want to render. This is not a concern when doing inference as far the standard 
econometric techniques take into account systematic measurement errors (employ-
ing country fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and country-specific trends absorbs 
the resulting variation). However, a bias could be present when looking at plain 
sample statistics.1
A second important issue in using criminal statistics is related to crime classifica-
tion. Indeed, the classification of crimes may vary across countries, because of 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Observations M SD Minimum Maximum
URate+ 697 3.786 4.606 0.000 24.171
URate− 697 3.263 4.344 0.000 22.964
Total crime rate 621 6,012.081 3,424.091 1,017.875 51,225.230
Homicide rate 598 1.774 1.771 0.155 10.140
Burglary rate 339 454.909 330.967 14.000 1,670.241
Robbery rate 303 111.781 74.972 5.515 292.951
Density 697 126.435 119.722 2.391 491.580
Males 15-29 697 3.720 0.438 2.813 4.931
GDP growth rate 697 0.026 0.029 −0.106 0.128
Real GDP 697 25,062.310 7,928.599 7,768.610 51,791.630
Note. GDP = gross domestic product.
different criminal codes. For instance, an act that is a property crime in Country A 
may be classified as a violent crime in Country B. As a consequence, if one wants to 
work with a homogeneous measure of crime rates across these different countries, it 
is required to use a measure that is unaffected both by underreporting and classifica-
tion issues.
For all the above reasons, in this article we will use the total number of homicides 
reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants as main measure of criminal activity.2 
This choice is dictated by the fact that homicides suffer much less underreporting and 
are more uniformly classified across countries. We also employ the total number of 
crimes (of any kind) recorded by the police that is the measure we use in Buonanno et 
al. (2011). In addition, we consider also more detailed crime category: burglary and 
robbery. Unfortunately, homogeneous and reliable data are available for these catego-
ries only from 1993.3
We collected data on crime and the explanatory variables of interest for EU15 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom with the exception of 
Luxembourg) and Norway, Canada, and the United States from 1970 to 2010. All 
explanatory variables are also normalized by the size of the population.
Our data set also includes a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables that 
are likely to be correlated with crime rates and therefore are included in the set of 
controls. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Demographic variables include 
the share of men aged 15 to 29 years from OECD statistics. Young men are thought to 
be more prone to engage in criminal activities than the rest of the population (Freeman, 
1996; Grogger, 1995). Specifically, it is well known in criminology that young males 
are statistically more likely to be offenders than any other demographic group. Levitt 
and Lochner (2001) note that 18-year-old individuals are five times more likely to be 
arrested for a property crime in the United States than their 35-year-old counterparts. 
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include lagged real GDP per capita, obtained 
from the Penn World Tables (PWT), and the lagged GDP growth rate, coming from 
OECD statistics. These factors proxy for the general level of prosperity in each country 
and, thus, for legitimate and illegitimate earning opportunities (Ehrlich, 1973). Moreover, 
both GDP and GDP growth rate allow us to control for the economic cycle. Finally, we 
include population density. It is well documented that the incidence of crime is higher in 
densely populated areas than in sparsely populated areas (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1999). 
Several reasons may determine this relation: in a dense area, the pool of potential victims 
is larger, in a dense area criminals could better exploit criminal networks, and finally 
dense areas may present scale economics crime (e.g., due to lower search costs).
Results
We estimate the model presented in equation (2), where the dependent variables are 
total crime rate, homicide rate, burglary rate, and robbery rate. As it is standard in the 
literature, we use the logarithm of these variables. Whereas the measures for unem-
ployment are defined as described in equation (1).
Our empirical findings are presented in Tables 2 to 5. All specifications include 
country fixed-effects and, where specified, year fixed-effects and a linear country-
specific time trend. In column 1 of all tables, we report the results where crime rate is 
explained by URate+ and URate− only (together with country fixed-effects). A one 
Table 2. Total Crime.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URate+ 0.036*** −0.038*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
URate− 0.044*** −0.036*** 0.018*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Density 0.006*** 0.009**
(0.001) (0.004)
Males 15-29 0.086*** 0.034
(0.026) (0.027)
Real GDP 0.052 −0.000
(0.038) (0.024)
GDP growth rate 0.239 −0.286
(0.490) (0.409)
Observations 582 582 582 582
R2 .827 .307 .883 .945
Country FE Y N Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y
Linear trend N N N Y
No. of countries 17 17 17 17
Note. All specifications include country fixed-effects and, where specified, year fixed-effects and a linear 
country-specific time trend. Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product; FE = fixed 
effect.
Significance levels: *10%. **5%. ***1%.
percentage point increase in unemployment increases total crime by 3.6% and homi-
cide rate by 2.7%, while unemployment does not exert any effect on robbery and 
burglary rates. On the other side, a one percentage point decrease in the unemploy-
ment rate lowers total crime rate by 4.4% and homicide rate by 2.9%. Column 2 is 
equal to column 1, except for the fact that year fixed-effects instead of country fixed-
effects are included. Column 3 includes year and country fixed-effects together with 
the set of our controls. The inclusion of controls and year dummies determines a 
substantial reduction of coefficient magnitude for the total crime and homicides, but 
not for robberies and burglaries. Indeed, a one percentage point increase in unem-
ployment increases total crime by 1.3% and homicide rate by 1.7%, while unemploy-
ment does not exert any effect on robbery and burglary rates. On the other side, a one 
percentage point decrease in unemployment rate lowers total crime and homicide rate 
by 1.8%. In column 4, where we control for linear country-specific trends, with the 
exception of total crime rates and robberies, the point estimates are not precisely 
estimated and smaller in magnitude. However, while this specification is the most 
robust since it includes country-specific trends, it is quite demanding as also year and 
Table 3. Homicide.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URate+ 0.027*** −0.009 0.017*** 0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
URate− 0.029*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.007
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Density 0.006* 0.010
(0.003) (0.006)
Males 15-29 0.123*** 0.065*
(0.027) (0.034)
Real GDP −0.026 −0.035
(0.049) (0.039)
GDP growth rate 0.496 0.247
(0.569) (0.497)
Observations 563 563 563 563
R2 .845 .120 .871 .916
Country FE Y N Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y
Linear trend N N N Y
No. of countries 16 16 16 16
Note. All specifications include country fixed-effects and, where specified, year fixed-effects and a linear 
country-specific time trend. Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product; FE = fixed 
effect.
Significance levels: *10%. **5%. ***1%.
Table 4. Robbery.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URate+ 0.029** 0.004 0.038*** 0.012*
(0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007)
URate− 0.040*** 0.016 0.044*** 0.006
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.008)
Density −0.004 −0.018
(0.005) (0.014)
Males 15-29 0.217*** −0.177**
(0.071) (0.076)
Real GDP 0.078 0.017
(0.089) (0.054)
GDP growth rate −2.396** −1.428**
(0.962) (0.551)
Observations 284 284 284 284
R2 .860 .140 .908 .978
Country FE Y N Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y
Linear trend N N N Y
No. of countries 17 17 17 17
Note. All specifications include country fixed-effects and, where specified, year fixed-effects and a linear 
country-specific time trend. Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product; FE = fixed 
effect.
Significance levels: *10%. **5%. ***1%.
country effects are included. In fact, genuine variation over time in unemployment 
rates that was used in the estimations in the previous columns can be absorbed by the 
state-specific trends.
As for the asymmetric response of crime to unemployment, we do not find any 
compelling evidence that in fact crime rates react asymmetrically in the way found by 
Mocan and Bali (2010). If anything, most of the point estimates of the unemployment 
rates during recoveries are larger than the point estimates during recessions, although 
the difference is far from being statistically significant. Unfortunately, it is not possi-
ble to investigate further the origin of this difference with respect to Mocan and Bali 
(2010). Admittedly, in their article, a more controlled design with one country and 
individual level data credibly supports the asymmetric response of crime rates to 
unemployment.
Conclusion
This article contributes to the literature on the effect of economic conditions on crime 
by exploiting variations in unemployment rates in a longitudinal data set covering the 
EU15 countries and Norway, Canada, and the United States from 1970 to 2010. Our 
results show that unemployment rates have a substantial effect on crime. Our cross-
country approach has the advantage of allowing interesting comparisons between 
developed countries but admittedly, using aggregate crime rates, we lose within coun-
try variation that is useful for the identification and estimation exercise. The lack of 
variation might partially explain the reduction in the significance of the coefficients of 
the unemployment variables on robberies and burglaries that are theoretically the kind 
of crimes more sensible to variations in unemployment rates. Nonetheless, this exer-
cise is useful to have a first overall picture of the effect of economic conditions in a big 
set of countries. Ideally, future research could investigate these relations more in 
depth, exploiting both cross- and within-country spatial variations in both crime rates 
and economic conditions.
According to our estimates, the four percentage points increase in the average 
unemployment rate between 2008 and 2012 during the great recession translate in an 
Table 5. Burglary.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URate+ 0.032*** −0.063*** 0.026** 0.004
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
URate− 0.037*** −0.048*** 0.028** 0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Density 0.012** −0.050**
(0.006) (0.020)
Males 15-29 0.237*** −0.097
(0.059) (0.115)
Real GDP 0.081 −0.013
(0.087) (0.055)
GDP growth rate −0.188 0.575
(1.517) (1.224)
Observations 319 319 319 319
R2 .793 .198 .809 .876
Country FE Y N Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y
Linear trend N N N Y
No. of countries 17 17 17 17
Note. All specifications include country fixed-effects and, where specified, year fixed-effects and a linear 
country-specific time trend. Standard errors in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product; FE = fixed 
effect.
Significance levels: *10%. **5%. ***1%.
average increase in crime rates of 5.2% in the correspondent years. Given the decreas-
ing trend in crime rates (e.g., see Buonanno et al., 2011), we can state that crime would 
have diminished even more drastically in the absence of the recession. While these 
estimates are to be taken cum grano salis given the methodological limitations, they 
are useful to assess in a preliminary way the impact of the recent great recession on 
crime.
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Notes
1. See Buonanno, Drago, Galbiati, and Zanella (2011) web appendix (https://sites.google.
com/site/crimeeuropeusreversal/) for a detailed analysis of reporting issues.
2. Only Spanish data are drawn from cause of death statistics.
3. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/data/database
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